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How definitive is the standard interpretation of
Goodstein’s argument
Bhupinder Singh Anand
Minor editing; new Lemma 6; graph of terminating Goodstein sequences included;
major revision of notation on October 31, 2018.∗
Abstract
Goodstein’s argument is essentially that the hereditary representationm[b]
of any given natural number m in the natural number base b can be mir-
rored in Cantor Arithmetic, and used to well-define a finite decreasing
sequence of transfinite ordinals each of which is not smaller than the ordi-
nal corresponding to the corresponding member of Goodstein’s sequence
of natural numbers G(m). The standard interpretation of this argument is
first that G(m) must therefore converge; and second that this conclusion—
Goodstein’s Theorem—is unprovable in Peano Arithmetic but true under
the standard interpretation of the Arithmetic. We argue however that
even assuming Goodstein’s Theorem is indeed unprovable in PA, its truth
must nevertheless be an intuitionistically unobjectionable consequence of
some constructive interpretation of Goodstein’s reasoning. We consider
such an interpretation, and construct a Goodstein functional sequence to
highlight why the standard interpretation of Goodstein’s argument ought
not to be accepted as a definitive property of the natural numbers.
Keywords Goodstein’s sequence; hereditary representation; limit ordinal ω; natural
numbers; ordinal numbers; Peano Arithmetic PA; set theory ZF; transfinite ordinals.
1 Introduction
Goodstein’s argument [Gd44] is essentially that the hereditary representation
m[b] in Peano Arithmetic
1, of any given natural numberm in the natural number
base b can be mirrored in Cantor’s (ordinal) Arithmetic2, and used to yield a
finite3, decreasing, sequence of transfinite ordinals, each of which is not smaller4
than the ordinal corresponding to the corresponding member of Goodstein’s
sequence of natural numbers G(m).
The standard interpretation of this argument is first that G(m) must there-
fore converge (Goodstein’s Theorem); second that this number-theoretic propo-
sition is unprovable in any formal system of Peano Arithmetic, but expresses
∗Subject class: LO; MSC: 03B10
1By Peano Arithmetic we mean the arithmetic of the natural numbers that is definable in
a formal number theory such as Mendelson’s theory S ([Me64], p102).
2By Cantor Arithmetic we mean the arithmetic of the ordinal numbers that is definable in
a formal set theory such as ZFC or NBG (cf. [Me64], p189).
3We note that for a sequence of ordinals to be termed as finite it must be a well-defined
set in Cantor Arithmetic ([Me64], p184).
4In the sense in which this relation is defined in Cantor Arithmetic.
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a truth under the standard interpretation of the Arithmetic that appeals nec-
essarily to transfinite reasoning (Kirby-Paris Theorem [KP82]); and third that
Goodstein’s Theorem is, in a sense, a proposition that under such interpretation
expresses a more natural independence phenomenon than Go¨del’s Theorem on
formally unprovable, but interpretatively true, sentences of any formal system
of Peano Arithmetic.
However we note first that Go¨del’s reasoning can be carried out in a weak
Arithmetic such as Robinson’s system Q [Ro50], which does not admit math-
ematical induction. The truth of the unprovable Go¨del sentence could thus
be reasonably argued as being even more intuitive than the truth—under the
standard interpretation—of any number-theoretic assertion of Peano Arithmetic
that necessarily appeals to mathematical induction. Moreover both truths are
classically accepted as constructive and intuitionistically unobjectionable.
We note further that Goodstein’s Theorem involves a non-constructive—
hence non-verifiable—concept of mathematical truth5 that, prima facie, is of a
higher order of intuition—in a manner of speaking—than that required to see
that Go¨del’s formally unprovable sentence is a true number-theoretic assertion
of Peano Arithmetic under its standard interpretation [Go31a].6
If, therefore, the proof of Goodstein’s Theorem is to be considered as hav-
ing established both an unprovable proposition of Peano Arithmetic that is
true under its standard interpretation, and a more natural independence phe-
nomenon than Go¨del’s, then such truth too must reasonably be a consequence
of some constructive—and intuitionistically unobjectionable—interpretation of
Goodstein’s reasoning.
In Section §8 we argue that such an interpretation does indeed exist as an
implicit thesis in Goodstein’s argument. In Sections §9 and §10 we consequently
construct and consider a Goodstein functional sequence that highlights why
the standard interpretations of this argument ought not to be considered as
definitive.
2 Notation and Definitions
Ordinal number notation: We denote the ordinal number corresponding to
the natural number m by [m].
Hereditary representation m[b] of a natural number m in base b: The
hereditary representation of the natural number m in the natural number base
b7, which we denote by m[b]
8, is its syntactic expression as a sum of powers of
the natural number base b, followed by expression of each of the exponents as a
sum of powers of b etc., until the process stops.
The rank of a hereditary representation: The rank of a hereditary repre-
sentation is the highest power of the natural number base that has a non-zero
5Necessarily so, according to a reasonable interpretation of the Kirby-Paris Theorem
[KP82].
6This follows since, as Gdel pertinently notes in his seminal 1931 paper ([Go31a], p26), the
truth of his unprovable sentence, under its standard interpretation, is meta-mathematically
verifiable constructively, in an intuitionistically unobjectionable manner, in Peano Arithmetic.
See, also, the reasoning in [An02a].
7It is implicit here, and in what follows, that (the base) b > 1.
8We note that m and m[b] denote, but are different syntactical expressions of, the same
natural number.
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co-efficient in the representation.
Goodstein Sequence: Let m[b →֒ (b+1)] be the non-negative integer which re-
sults if we syntactically replace each b by (b+1) in the hereditary representation
m[b] of a natural number m in base b
9. Starting at the hereditary representation
of the natural number m in base 2, we formally define the Goodstein sequence,
G(m) as:
{g1(m), g2(m), g3(m) . . .} (1)
where:
gn(m) ≡ (g(n−1)(m)[n →֒ (n+1)] − 1) (2)
Goodstein’s Theorem: For all natural numbers m, there exists a natural
number n such that the nth term, gn(m)[(n+1)], of the Goodstein sequence
G(m) is 0.
3 The Goodstein operations
We note that each natural number m has a unique hereditary representation,
of some finite rank l, in any given natural number base b. Without loss of
generality, we may express this syntactically as:
m[b] =
l∑
i=0
ai.b
i[b] (3)
where:
(a) 0 ≤ ai < b over 0 ≤ i ≤ l;
(b) al 6= 0;
(c) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ l the exponent i too is expressed syntactically
by its hereditary representation i[b] in the base [b]; as also are all
of its exponents and, in turn, all of their exponents, etc.
3.1 Goodstein bumping operation
We define the Goodstein bumping operation10, on the hereditary representation
of the natural number m in the natural number base b, by:
The Goodstein bumping operation: The natural numberm[b →֒ (b+1)] is
derived fromm under a Goodstein bumping operation by syntactically replacing
9We note that m[b →֒ (b+1)] is also, sometimes, denoted in the literature by B(b, m), where
B is referred to as the Goodstein ‘bumping’ or ‘base-change’ function, and B(b, m) is the
non-negative integer that results if we syntactically replace each b by (b+1) in the hereditary
representation m[b] of the natural number m in the base b.
10We prefer to define these concepts as ‘operations’, rather than as ‘functions’, simply to
avoid any implicit commitment to possible set-theoretic properties.
3
the base b by the base (b+ 1) in the hereditary representation m[b] of m in the
base b.
We can express this, also without loss of generality, as:
m[b →֒ (b+1)] =
l∑
i=0
ai.(b + 1)
i[b →֒ (b+1)] (4)
3.2 Complete Goodstein operation
We, then, define the result of a complete Goodstein operation, on the hereditary
representation of a natural number m in the natural number base b, as the
natural number m[b →֒ (b+1)] − 1.
4 Goodstein’s argument
In his 1944 paper Goodstein essentially considers, for any given natural number
m, the sequence, say G(m), of natural numbers of Peano Arithmetic:
{g1(m)[2], g2(m)[3], g3(m)[4], g4(m)[5], . . .} (5)
and the parallel sequence, O(mo), of ordinal numbers of Cantor Arithmetic:
{g1(mo)[2o →֒ ω], g2(mo)[3o →֒ ω], g3(mo)[4o →֒ ω], g4(mo)[5o →֒ ω], . . .} (6)
where gn(mo)[(no+1o) →֒ ω] is the ordinal number obtained from gn(m)[(n+1)] by
syntactically replacing all natural numbers in gn(m)[(n+1)] by their correspond-
ing ordinals, other terms by their corresponding11 set-theoretical terms, and
then syntactically replacing the ordinal base [no + 1o] by the ordinal [ω].
Now, by properties of ordinal addition, multiplication and exponentiation
([Me64], p189) we have, for any given natural number m[b], the ordinal inequal-
ity, mo[bo →֒ ω] > mo[bo], where mo denotes the ordinal corresponding to the
natural number m, and ω denotes Cantor’s lowest transfinite ordinal.
Further, by arithmetical properties that are characteristic of transfinite ordi-
nals such as ω, it can be shown that O(mo) is a decreasing sequence of transfinite
ordinals, each of whose members is not smaller than the ordinal corresponding
to the corresponding member of the sequence of natural numbers, G(m).
Since in Cantor Arithmetic the ordinals are well-ordered, and there are no
infinite, decreasing, sequences of ordinals, Goodstein concludes that O(mo) is a
finite sequence of transfinite ordinals.
11We assume that such a correspondence exists, along the lines described, for instance, in
Mendelson ([Me64], p192).
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5 Goodstein’s Theorem
Now, assuming that a set theory such as ZFC can be treated as a consistent
extension of the first order Peano Arithmetic PA12, the standard interpretation
of Goodstein’s argument is, then:
Goodstein’s Theorem: For all natural numbers m, there exists a natural
number n such that the nth term gn(m) of the Goodstein sequence G(m) is 0.
We note that this interpretation of Goodstein’s argument is supported by
the following examples.
5.1 Example: m = 1
g1(1)[2] = 1 · 2
0
g1(1)[2 →֒ 3] = 1 · 3
0
g2(1)[3] = 0 · 3
0
Hence G(1) is {1, 0}.
5.2 Example: m = 2
g1(2)[2] = 1 · 2
1 + 0 · 20
g1(2)[2 →֒ 3] = 1 · 3
1 + 0 · 30
g2(2)[3] = 0 · 3
1 + 2 · 30
g2(2)[3 →֒ 4] = 0 · 4
1 + 2 · 40
g3(2)[4] = 0 · 4
1 + 1 · 40
g3(2)[4 →֒ 5] = 0 · 5
1 + 1 · 50
g4(2)[5] = 0 · 5
1 + 0 · 50
Hence G(2) is {2, 2, 1, 0}.
5.3 Example: m = 3
g1(3)[2] = 1 · 2
1 + 1 · 20
g1(3)[2 →֒ 3] = 1 · 3
1 + 1 · 30
g2(3)[3] = 1 · 3
1 + 0 · 30
g2(3)[3 →֒ 4] = 1 · 4
1 + 0 · 40
g3(3)[4] = 0 · 4
1 + 3 · 40
12That a set theory, such as ZFC, cannot be unrestrictedly treated as a consistent extension
of a first order Peano Arithmetic, such as standard PA, is also suggested by independent
arguments offered in [An02b].
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g3(3)[4 →֒ 5] = 0 · 5
1 + 3 · 50
g4(3)[5] = 0 · 5
1 + 2 · 50
g4(3)[5 →֒ 6] = 0 · 6
1 + 2 · 60
g5(3)[6] = 0 · 6
1 + 1 · 60
g5(3)[6 →֒ 7] = 0 · 7
1 + 1 · 70
g6(3)[7] = 0 · 7
1 + 0 · 70
Hence G(3) is {3, 3, 3, 2, 1, 0}.
6 Some Goodstein sequence lemmas
However, we now argue that to the extent that standard interpretations of Good-
stein’s argument use, but ignore the significance of, the fact that arithmetical
properties of the natural number sequence G(m) are not necessarily shared by
the corresponding transfinite ordinal sequence O(mo), such interpretations can-
not be considered definitive.
In order to highlight the significance of the above distinction, we introduce
some general properties of sequences generated by iterated application of the
complete Goodstein operation on the hereditary representation of the natural
number m in a natural number base b.
6.1 The first Goodstein sequence lemma
We note first that:
Lemma 1 If there exists a natural number n such that the nth term gn(m) of
the Goodstein sequence G(m) is 0 then, for all m > 3, there is some k < n such
that g(k−1)(m) > g(k)(m).
Proof : We have by definition:
g(n−1)(m)[n] ≡
l∑
i=0
ai.n
i[n] (7)
and:
gn(m)[(n+1)] ≡ (
l∑
i=0
ai.(n+ 1)
i[n →֒ (n+1)])− 1 (8)
where:
6
(a) 0 ≤ ai < n over 0 ≤ i ≤ l;
(b) al 6= 0;
(c) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ l the exponent i too is expressed syntactically
by its hereditary representation i[n] in the base [n]; as also are all
of its exponents and, in turn, all of their exponents, etc.
Hence:
g2(m)[3] − g1(m)[2] ≡
l∑
i=0
(ai.3
i[2 →֒ 3] − ai.2
i[2])− 1
Now, if m > 3 then l ≥ 2. Hence:
g2(m)[3] − g1(m)[2] ≥ (3
l[2 →֒ 3] − 2l[2])− 1
≥ (32[2 →֒ 3] − 22[2])− 1
> 1
The lemma follows. ✷
6.2 The second Goodstein sequence lemma
Lemma 2 If the hereditary representation of the kth term, gk(m) of the Good-
stein sequence G(m) contains more than one non-zero term, then g(k+1)(m) ≥
gk(m).
Proof : We have:
g(k+1)(m)[(k+2)] − gk(m)[(k+1)] ≡ (
l∑
i=0
ai((k + 2)
i[(k+1) →֒ (k+2)] − (k + 1)i[(k+1)]))− 1
where:
(a) 0 ≤ ai < k over 0 ≤ i ≤ l;
(b) al 6= 0;
(c) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ l the exponent i too is expressed syntactically
by its hereditary representation i[k] in the base [k]; as also are all
of its exponents and, in turn, all of their exponents, etc.
If now 0 ≤ j < l and aj , al 6= 0, then l ≥ 1 and:
g(k+1)(m)[(k+2)] − gk(m)[(k+1)] ≥ al((k + 2)
l[(k+1) →֒ (k+2)] − (k + 1)l[(k+1)])− 1
≥ al((k + 2)
1[(k+1) →֒ (k+2)] − (k + 1)1[(k+1)])− 1
≥ 0
The lemma follows. ✷
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6.3 The third Goodstein sequence lemma
Lemma 3 If the hereditary representation of the kth term gk(m) of the Good-
stein sequence G(m) is of the form al · (k + 1)
l[(k+1)] , where 1 ≤ al < (k + 1)
then g(k+1)(m) ≥ gk(m) if l ≥ 1 and g(k+1)(m) < gk(m) if l = 0.
Proof : We have:
gk(m)[(k+1)] = al · (k + 1)
l[(k+1)]
and:
g(k+1)(m)[(k+2)] − gk(m)[(k+1)] = al((k + 2)
l[(k+1) →֒ (k+2)] − (k + 1)l[(k+1)])− 1
Then if l ≥ 1:
g(k+1)(m)[(k+2)] − gk(m)[(k+1)] ≥ al((k + 2)− (k + 1))− 1
≥ al − 1
≥ 0
Whilst if l = 0:
g(k+1)(m)[(k+2)] − gk(m)[(k+1)] = al((k + 2)
0 − (k + 1)0)− 1
= −1
The lemma follows. ✷
6.4 The fourth Goodstein sequence lemma
Lemma 4 If the nth term gn(m) of the Goodstein sequence G(m) is 0, then
n = 2n1 for some natural number n1 > 1 and g(n1−1)(m)[n1] = 1 · n
1
1 + 0 · n
0
1.
Proof : If gn(m) = 0 for some natural numbers m and n then:
If n > 1, then gn(m)[(n+1)] = 0 · (n+ 1)
0
If n > 2, then g(n−1)(m)[n] = 1 · (n)
0
If n > 3, then g(n−2)(m)[(n−1)] = 2 · (n− 1)
0
If n > 5, then g(n−3)(m)[(n−2)] = 3 · (n− 2)
0
. . .
If n > (2r − 1), then g(n−r)(m)[(n−r+1)] = r · (n− r + 1)
0.
Now, for some natural number n1 > 1, we must have either n = (2n1 + 1) or
n = 2n1. If n = (2n1 + 1) then:
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g(n−n1)(m) + 1 = n1 · (n− n1 + 1)
0 + 1 · (n− n1 + 1)
0
= (n1 + 1) · (n1 + 2)
0
However, since (n1+1) ·(n1+2)
0 is not the result of any Goodstein bumping
operation, we cannot have n = (2n1 + 1).
Hence, n = 2n1 and:
g(n−n1)(m)[(n−n1+1)] = n1 · (n− n1 + 1)
0
gn1(m)[(n1+1)] = n1 · (n1 + 1)
0
g(n1−1)(m)[n1] = 1 · n
1
1 + 0 · n
0
1
The lemma follows. ✷
We further have:
Corollary 1 If the nth term gn(m) of the Goodstein sequence G(m) is 0, then
n = 2n1 and, for n1 ≤ k ≤ n, we have that gk(m) = (n− k).
6.5 The fifth Goodstein sequence lemma
Lemma 5 If the nth term gn(m) of the Goodstein sequence G(m) is 0, then
n = 2(2n2+1) for some natural number n2 and g(n2−1)(m)[n2] = 2 · n
1
2 +0 · n
0
2.
Proof : Arguing as before, we have that:
If n1 > 2, then g(n1−1)(m)[n1] = 1 · n
1
1 + 0 · n
0
1
If n1 > 3, then g(n1−2)(m)[(n1)−1] = 1 · (n1 − 1)
1 + 0 · (n1 − 1)
0
If n1 > 4, then g(n1−3)(m)[(n1)−2] = 1 · (n1 − 2)
1 + 0 · (n1 − 2)
0
If n1 > 6, then g(n1−4)(m)[(n1)−3] = 1 · (n1 − 3)
1 + 0 · (n1 − 3)
0
. . .
If n1 > 2r, then g(n1−r)(m)[(n1)−r+1] = 1 · (n1 − r + 1)
1 + 0 · (n1 − r + 1)
0
We thus have that (n1 − 1) must also be even and, if (n1 − 1) = 2n2, then:
If n2 > 3 then g(n2−1)(m)[n2] = 2 · n
1
2 + 0 · n
0
2.
The lemma follows. ✷
Corollary 2 If the nth term gn(m) of the Goodstein sequence G(m) is 0, then
n = 2(2n2 + 1) for some natural number n2 and, for n2 ≤ k < 2n2, we have
that gk(m) = g(k+1)(m).
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6.6 The sixth Goodstein sequence lemma
Lemma 6 (p > m)→ (gn(p) ≥ gn(m))
Proof : We have that:
p > m ≡ g1(p) > gn(m)
g(n)(p)[(n+1)] > g(n)(m)[(n+1)] ≡ (
lp∑
i=0
ai.(n+ 1)
i[(n+1)])
> (
lm∑
i=0
ai.(n+ 1)
i[(n+1)])
→ (
lp∑
i=0
ai.(n+ 2)
i[(n+1) →֒(n+2)])
> (
lm∑
i=0
ai.(n+ 2)
i[(n+1) →֒(n+2)])
→ (
lp∑
i=0
ai.(n+ 2)
i[(n+1) →֒(n+2)] − 1)
≥ (
lm∑
i=0
ai.(n+ 2)
i[(n+1) →֒(n+2)] − 1)
→ g(n+1)(p)[(n+2)] ≥ g(n+1)(m)[(n+2)]
The lemma follows by induction. ✷
7 Three Goodstein sequence theorems
It immediately follows from the above lemmas that:
Theorem 1 (First Goodstein sequence theorem): If the nth term gn(m) of the
Goodstein sequence G(m) is 0, then n = 2(2n2+1) for some natural number n2
and:
gk(m) = (n− k) for (2n2 + 1) ≤ k ≤ n
gk(m) = g(k+1)(m) for n2 ≤ k < 2n2
gk(m) < g(k+1)(m) for 1 ≤ k < n2
Theorem 1 highlights the characteristic structure of all terminating Good-
stein sequences as schematically depicted below for G(p) and G(m) where p >
m > 4 13.
13The characteristic structure of all terminating Goodstein sequences, expressed by this
theorem, was investigated interestingly by R.E.S. [Re03], and visualised intriguingly in a
striking computer-generated plot of G(m) for m ≥ 4 as mentioned here.
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Fig 1: Characteristic structure of terminating Goodstein Sequences: m < p
We can further conclude that:
Theorem 2 Any sequence generated by the iterated application of the complete
Goodstein operation on the hereditary representation of any natural number in
any natural number base cannot oscillate.
Corollary 3 For any given natural number m, the Goodstein sequence G(m)
of natural numbers converges if, and only if, it is bounded finitely in Peano
Arithmetic.
We note next that ifH(k) is the sequence of finite natural numbers generated
by iterated application of the complete Goodstein operation on the hereditary
representation of kk in the base [k], then:
Lemma 7 For any natural number k, the sequence H(k) = {h1(k), h2(k), h3(k), . . .}
defined by:
h1(k)[k] = k
k[k]
hn+1(k)[(k+n)] = hn(k)[(k+n−1)→֒ (k+n)] − 1
is a finite sequence that terminates with 0.
Proof : By definition:
h1(k)[k] = 1 · k
k[k] + 0 · k(k−1)[k] + 0 · k(k−2)[k] + . . .+ 0 · k0[k]
h2(k)[k+1] = (1 · (k + 1)
k[k →֒ (k+1)] + 0 · (k + 1)(k−1)[k →֒ (k+1)] +
0 · (k + 1)(k−2)[k →֒ (k+1)] + . . .+ 0 · (k + 1)0[k →֒ (k+1)])− 1
= (1 · (k + 1)(k+1)[(k+1)] + 0 · (k + 1)(k−1)[(k+1)] +
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0 · (k + 1)(k−2)[(k+1)] + . . .+ 0 · (k + 1)0[(k+1)])− 1
= k · (k + 1)k[(k+1)] + k · (k + 1)(k−1)[(k+1)] +
k · (k + 1)(k−2)[(k+1)] + . . .+ k · (k + 1)0[(k+1)]
. . .
Thus, H(k) is a sequence of natural numbers each of whose members is
such that the rank of the hereditary representation of any successor-member is
less than the base of the representation; in other words, the complete Goodstein
operation leaves the exponents in the hereditary representation of any successor-
member unchanged (as in Goodstein’s argument with transfinite ordinals).
Now, we note that a complete Goodstein operation on any number of the
form:
l∑
i=0
aik
i
where 1 ≤ al, l < k and ai = 0 for 0 ≤ i < l:
(i) either yields, if al > 1, a number of the same rank l but with a
reduced co-efficient of the highest power of the base, such as:
l∑
i=0
ci(k + 1)
i
where cl = (al − 1) and 0 < ci < (k + 1) for 0 ≤ i < l;
(ii) or yields, if al = 1, a number of reduced rank such as:
l−1∑
i=0
ci(k + 1)
i
where 0 < ci < (k + 1) for 0 ≤ i < (l − 1).
In either case, it can be shown by finite induction that iterated application
of the complete Goodstein operation must eventually reduce the rank of some
member of the sequence to 0. By Lemma 6.3 the sequence must therefore
terminate with 0.
The lemma follows. ✷
We, thus, have that:
Theorem 3 (Third Goodstein sequence theorem): For any given natural num-
ber m the Goodstein sequence G(m) converges finitely if, and only if, there is
some natural number k such that:
gn(m) > 0→ (hn(k) > gn(m))
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Proof : We note firstly that, if there is a convergent sequence H(k) as defined
above, then G(m) is a finitely bounded sequence and so, by the preceding lem-
mas, it must converge to 0.
Secondly, if G(m) converges finitely in n terms, and the largest member of
the sequence is p, we can take k = max(n, p). By lemma 7, h2q(k) = 0 for some
q.
Since, by the first Goodstein sequence theorem 1, the largest term in H(k)
is hq(k) = q and we also have that q > k
k, it follows that q > n. Hence for any
n such that gn(m) 6= 0 we have that hn(k) > gn(m). ✷
8 Goodstein’s implicit Thesis
We can now express Goodstein’s implicit thesis as:
Thesis 1 (The Goodstein Thesis): For any given natural numbers m and k,
and partial sequences {gn(m) : 1 ≤ n ≤ k}, i.e.:
{g1(m)[2], g2(m)[3], . . . , gk(m)[(k+1)]}
and {gn(m)[(n+1) →֒ uk] : 1 ≤ n ≤ k}, i.e.:
{g1(m)[2 →֒ uk], g2(m)[3 →֒ uk], . . . , gk(m)[(k+1) →֒ uk]}
where:
(i) [uk] is the base of the largest term in the partial sequence {gn(m) :
1 ≤ n ≤ k};
(ii) and gn(m)[(n+1) →֒ uk] is the natural number obtained from the
hereditary representation of gn(m)[(n+1))] by syntactically replacing
the base [(n+ 1)] by the base [uk];
we have that:
(Lt uk) < ω
Now, by the first Goodstein sequence theorem there is no natural number
base [uk] for which we have that, for all n ≥ 1:
gn(m)[(n+1) →֒ uk] < g(n+1)(m)[(n+2) →֒ uk]
Thus Goodstein’s argument appeals to properties of sequences of transfinite
ordinals in Cantor Arithmetic that do not correspond to any arithmetical prop-
erties of their corresponding sequences of natural numbers in Peano Arithmetic.
It follows we cannot prima facie conclude that, by simply replacing a con-
structive natural number base [uk] by the non-constructive ordinal base [ω],
Goodstein’s argument establishes Goodstein’s Theorem as a true assertion of
Peano Arithmetic under its standard interpretation in a constructive, and intu-
itionistically unobjectionable, way.
Such a conclusion must therefore implicitly appeal to some non-constructive,
and counter-intuitive, assumption that needs to be expressed explicitly.
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9 A Goodstein functional sequence
The above point is illustrated better if we define the sequence of functions:
{g1(m)[2 →֒ x], g2(m)[3 →֒ x], . . . , gk(m)[(k+1) →֒ x]}
as the Goodstein functional sequence of m.
Now, if gn(m)[(n+1) →֒ x] has a constant term c where x > c > 0, we have:
gn(m)[(n+1) →֒ x] − g(n+1)(m)[(n+2) →֒ x] = 1
whilst if the lowest power of x in gn(m)[(n+1) →֒ x] is c · x
a, where c and a are
constants such that a > 0 and x > c > 0, then:
gn(m)[(n+1) →֒ x] − g(n+1)(m)[(n+2) →֒ x] ≥ (x− 2)x
(a−1)
Hence, for all natural numbers u > 2:
{gn(m)[(n+1) →֒ u] : n ≥ 1}
is a finite, decreasing, sequence of natural numbers.
Now, if the Goodstein sequence G(m) terminates after l terms then, for any
n ≥ 1:
gn(m)[(n+1) →֒ l] ≥ gn(m)[(n+1)]
However, if G(m) does not terminate then, for any given u > 2, there can
be no decreasing sequence of natural numbers {gn(m)[(n+1) →֒ u] : n ≥ 1} such
that gn(m)[(n+1) →֒ l] ≥ gn(m)[(n+1)] for any n ≥ 1.
However in either case—treating gn(m)[(no+1) →֒ x] as a function over the
ordinals—there is always a decreasing sequence of transfinite ordinals:
{gn(mo)[(no+1) →֒ ω] : n ≥ 1}
where mo, no are the finite ordinals corresponding to the natural number m, n.
10 Formal mathematical objects
Now, as noted above, Goodstein’s argument does not directly address this issue
of the upper bound of a Goodstein sequence in Peano Arithmetic. Instead it
indirectly—and implicitly—concludes the existence of such a bound since there
is a finite, recursively well-defined, decreasing sequence {gn(mo)[(no+1o) →֒ ω]}
of transfinite ordinals in Cantor Arithmetic such that, for any n such that
gn(mo)[(no+1o)] 6= 0o, we have that gn(mo)[(no+1o) →֒ ω] ≥ gn(mo)[(no+1o)].
14
However, in the absence of a constructive proof—or meta-proof14—to the
contrary, we must admit the possibility that some Goodstein sequence of natural
numbers in Peano Arithmetic does not converge. The latter would be the case
if Goodstein’s assumption—that we can recursively define an ordinal sequence
{gn(mo)[(no+1o) →֒ ω]} as a well-defined, formal, mathematical object in Cantor
Arithmetic—is invalid. Consequently, Goodstein’s argument—that this ordinal
sequence is a well-defined, finite15, decreasing, set in any putative model of
Cantor Arithmetic—would be vacuously true.
It follows that, if we admit such a possibility, then we cannot treat the
standard interpretations of Goodstein’s argument as establishing Goodstein’s
Theorem definitively.
We can express the above reservation more precisely. Goodstein’s argument
ignores the possibility that the recursively defined ordinal sequence:
{gn(mo)[(no+1o) →֒ ω]}
may not be a formal mathematical object in Cantor Arithmetic (i.e., in a set
theory such as, say, ZFC), in the following sense:
Definition 1 A primitive mathematical object is any symbol for an
individual constant, predicate letter, or a function letter16 which is
defined as a primitive symbol of a formal mathematical language.
Definition 2 A formal mathematical object is any symbol for an
individual constant, predicate letter, or a function letter that is either
a primitive mathematical object, or that can be introduced through
definition17 into a formal mathematical language without inviting
inconsistency18.
Definition 3 A mathematical object is any symbol that is either a
primitive mathematical object or a formal mathematical object.
Definition 4 A set is the range of any function whose function let-
ter is a formal mathematical object.
Consideration of formal mathematical objects in more detail would lie out-
side the immediate scope of this investigation, whose limited aim is to establish
that, prima facie, there are sufficient grounds for arguing that the standard
interpretations of Goodstein’s argument ought not to be accepted as definitive.
Nevertheless we note that in [An02b] we consider the existence of a primitive
recursive number-theoretic relation that is intuitively decidable constructively,
14We note that such a meta-proof need not be provable in PA; in other words, the truth—or
falsity—of Goodstein’s Theorem in the standard interpretation of PA does not depend on the
existence of a PA proof sequence for the Theorem (or for its negation).
15As ([Me64 previously noted, for the sequence to be termed as finite, it must be a well-
defined set in Cantor Arithmetic], p184).
16cf. [Me64], p46; also p1, p10.
17cf. [Me64], p82.
18We take Mendelson’s Corollary 1.15 ([Me64], p37) as the classical meta-definition of con-
sistency.
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but which cannot be introduced through definition as a formal mathematical
object into the formal system of Peano Arithmetic PA without inviting incon-
sistency. Ipso facto, such a relation cannot be introduced through definition as
a formal mathematical object into any Axiomatic Set Theory, such as ZFC, in
which the axioms of PA interpret as theorems. Hence it is not a formal math-
ematical object and the range of its characteristic function is not a recursively
enumerable set.
Since recursive number-theoretic functions and relations are classically ac-
cepted as amongst the most basic building blocks for defining constructive,
and intuitionistically unobjectionable, mathematical objects, we cannot prima
facie accept Goodstein’s argument as sufficient for establishing the recursively
defined—and admittedly non-constructive—ordinal sequence {gn(mo)[(no+1o) →֒ ω]}
as a formal mathematical object in Cantor Arithmetic.
11 Conclusion
Goodstein’s argument implicitly assumes that the recursively defined ordinal se-
quence {gn(mo)[(no+1o) →֒ ω]} is a formal mathematical object in Cantor Arith-
metic. In other words, it implicitly assumes the existence of a well-defined set of
transfinite ordinals in Cantor Arithmetic which has properties corresponding to
the properties required of the number-theoretic sequence H(k) that is defined
in Lemma 7 above.
Since, as argued in [An02b], such an assumption need not necessarily hold,
Goodstein’s Theorem can reasonably be viewed as a number-theoretic proposi-
tion whose truth in the standard interpretation of any formal system of Peano
Arithmetic has simply been asserted as a non-verifiable consequence of a non-
constructive argument.
We conclude that in the absence of a constructive and intuitionistically
unobjectionable proof—or meta-proof—that any given Goodstein sequence is
bounded in Peano Arithmetic, the standard interpretation of Goodstein’s The-
orem as a number-theoretic assertion that is consistent with any formal system
of Peano Arithmetic, such as standard PA, ought not to be accepted as defini-
tive.
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